Inset left: UNITED STATES – MARCH 4: President Donald Trump arrives to deliver his address to a joint session of Congress in the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol on Tuesday, March 4, 2025 (Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call via AP Images). Inset right: U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro at a press conference detailing the arrest of Zubayr al-Bakoush, a person connected to the 2012 U.S. Embassy attack in Benghazi, at the Department of Justice building in Washington, D.C., on Friday, February 6, 2026. (Photo by Annabelle Gordon/Sipa USA)(Sipa via AP Images). Background: NATIONAL HARBOR, MD, USA — February 20 2025: Steve Bannon speaks on day 1 of the 2025 Conservative Political Action Conference (Photo by Joshua Sukoff/Medill News Service/Sipa USA)(Sipa via AP Images).
A federal judge has pointedly rejected efforts by the Trump administration and Steve Bannon to wipe away the former Trump White House chief strategist's contempt of Congress conviction.
In a four-page order, U.S. District Judge Carl J. Nichols, who was appointed by President Donald Trump during his first term, found arguments by the Department of Justice wholly lacking.
Under the relevant federal rule, the judicial leave requirement "contemplates exposure of the reasons for dismissal," Nichols noted, citing precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit. In plain terms, this means a motion for dismissal must contain "a statement of reasons" beyond "a mere conclusory statement," the judge elaborated.
And that's just not what the DOJ provided.
"The government has determined in its prosecutorial discretion that dismissal of this criminal case is in the interests of justice," the two-page February motion to dismiss reads in relevant part.
Nichols said the government simply had to provide more than the "sole explanatory sentence" penned by U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro.
"The Government's motion does not explain its motivations for seeking dismissal of the indictment and thus fails to meet Rule 48(a)'s procedural requirement," the court's order continues.
Rather, Nichols said, Pirro's terse effort on Bannon's behalf "is the kind of 'conclusory statement by the prosecutor' that the Court of Appeals has said is insufficient to justify a Rule 48(a) motion."
The judge spends some time explaining the court's discretion here.
"The Supreme Court long ago stated that this 'leave of court' requirement 'obviously vest[s] some discretion in the court," the order goes on. "As the Court of Appeals has put it, the 'requirement of judicial leave . . . gives the court a role in dismissals following indictment.'"
Nichols notes that Bannon, of course, consents to the dismissal, so there are no concerns about the defendant suffering "harassment."
But still, the judge says, the court can play an active role.
"[E]ven in the 'distinctly different situation' where a 'defendant concurs in the dismissal,' the 'leave of court' proviso still may require 'an independent judicial assessment of the public interest in dismissing the indictment," the order continues.
In a footnote, Nichols says the D.C. Circuit is not alone in requiring "both procedural and substantive" compliance with the rule.
"[T]he trial court at the very least must know the prosecutor's reasons for seeking to dismiss the indictment and the facts underlying the prosecutor's decision," Nichols writes, citing precedent again. "[T]he prosecutor is under an obligation to supply sufficient reasons—reasons that constitute more than 'a mere conclusory interest' [supporting dismissal]."
One purpose for the rule, the court says, is to act as a "sunshine … provision that exposes the reasons for prosecutorial decisions."
The reason supplied by the DOJ did not come close, Nichols found. But the court gave the government another chance.
"The Court will therefore deny the Government's motion without prejudice," the order goes on. "The Government is free to submit a renewed motion that complies with Rule 48(a)'s requirements."
In another footnote, however, Nichols directed the DOJ's likely forthcoming effort to specifically address a more recent — and potentially troublesome — bit of precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In 2025, the appeals court held the "plain meaning of Rule 48(a), understood in light of the common law and against the backdrop of constitutional separation of powers, is that the government may dismiss a prosecution only while the prosecution is pending," Nichols noted.
And, in that 2025 case, the Supreme Court declined to reconsider the appellate court's ruling, the footnote further explains.
Nichols suggests this directly bears upon Bannon's case due to the somewhat cross-pollinating order of events.
In May 2025, a panel on the D.C. Circuit nixed Bannon's bid to reconsider his effort to dismiss the conviction.
Then two things happened in quick succession.
First, Bannon appealed to the nation's high court. Second, the Trump administration moved to dismiss at the district court level.
The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the appellate court's ruling and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit "for further consideration in light of the pending motion to dismiss the indictment."
But that order clearly did not settle the case.
"Although the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Bannon's conviction, the judgment of this Court has not been vacated," Nichols explains, using emphasis.
So, while Bannon and the DOJ jointly asked for — and received — a remand from the D.C. Circuit back to Nichols "with instructions to address the pending motion to dismiss the indictment," the case law in the district suggests that such relief is still out of reach.
"The Government should therefore explain whether [that still-valid precedent mentioned above] bars this Court from dismissing the indictment under Rule 48(a)," Nichols concludes.