Left: President Donald Trump walks from Marine One after arriving on the South Lawn of the White House, Tuesday, July 15, 2025, in Washington (AP Photo/Alex Brandon, File). Right: Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis is seen at the Georgia State Capitol during questioning from a Georgia State Senate panel about her prosecution of President Donald Trump on Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025, in Atlanta (AP Photo/Brynn Anderson).

Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis' office argued before a three-judge Georgia Court of Appeals panel on Tuesday that the "wholly disqualified" prosecutor was wrongly denied a chance to intervene as President Donald Trump and other former RICO defendants seek millions in legal fees.

Judges Elizabeth Gobeil, J. Wade Padgett and Ken Hodges III pressed Chief Senior Assistant District Attorney Donald Wakeford the moment he called this "quite literally" an "unprecedented" situation under Georgia law.

The attorney claimed that Fulton County Superior Court Judge Scott McAfee "committed clear errors" when he declined to allow Willis' office to intervene in the fee dispute.

Arguing that it is a "wholly distinct" matter from the RICO case itself, in that it "arose out of a prior criminal case" and isn't itself a criminal case, Wakeford noted that the RICO case "has ended" and the fee issue is something like "contempt proceedings."

"If you were to look at an appeal from a contempt matter and you looked at the underlying case number, it would be a criminal case number. That doesn't mean what you're seeing is a criminal proceeding," Wakeford said. "It doesn't mean the state of Georgia's interests are implicated in that proceeding, and it doesn't mean that a prosecutor, a DA, could stand in the stead of the person whose rights are at risk in that in that appeal."

Wakeford was referring to Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia Executive Director Peter Skandalakis, who appointed himself as "District Attorney Pro Tempore" after the Georgia Supreme Court declined to review and reverse Willis' disqualification from the case.

The Georgia Court of Appeals earlier ruled in a 2-1 decision that McAfee "erred by failing to disqualify DA Willis and her office" because this was a "rare case" in which the "significant appearance of impropriety" alone meant Willis and her office should be "wholly disqualified."

McAfee had said either Willis or her handpicked special prosecutor Nathan Wade, with whom she had a romantic relationship, had to exit the case.

Once the disqualification dust settled, Skandalakis filed a formal nolle prosequi abandoning the case to "serve the interests of justice." The former RICO defendants promptly cited a new Georgia law that "shall" entitle them to an award following Willis' "improper conduct."

Wakeford insisted that the interests of Willis' office weren't adequately represented by Skandalakis and that "we haven't been disqualified from this matter."

"The interest of the taxpayers in seeing that these funds, which are otherwise supposed to be allocated to the prosecution of crimes by the in the Atlanta Judicial Circuit by the DA's office, are imperiled by these claims," Wakeford said. "If they are not rigorously evaluated and contested, and the reasonableness of them assessed by some adversarial party, then otherwise the interests of the taxpayers are completely disregarded."

Padgett interjected there.

"Just because we haven't seen it, do you contend the legislature is not doesn't have the authority to do it?" the judge asked, referring to Georgia Code 17-11-6.

After a pause, Wakeford answered, "I would say that, yes, the legislature does not have the authority to do it."

"I would say this is an unconstitutional statute," he added.

"That's something for another court in another day," Hodges stated, getting no disagreement from Wakeford on that point.

The DA's office said "that's part of the problem."

"We're here answering a very specific question, talking about adequate representation, but there are all these other issues that that are created by this statute, by its novelty, by its confusion, that need to be fully addressed, and that we did not have the opportunity to participate in because of how this order was handed down," Wakeford said.

Chris Anulewicz, arguing for the former RICO defendants, countered that this is neither an "unprecedented case" nor a "confusing case."

"This is an easy case," he said, backing the General Assembly's authority to make the law as it did. "Just because the case is over doesn't mean that this statutory right for fees isn't in the [criminal] case. The General Assembly knows what it's doing."

Padgett asked him if there was "any question" that 17-11-6 applies in the case, noting that the "statute is premised upon a finding of improper conduct."

"The trial judge found an appearance of impropriety and found that actual misconduct had not been established," the judge said. "Is that problematic?"

The lawyer said he didn't think so because Willis' conduct created the "appearance of impropriety."

"Did that conduct cause the disqualification?" Gobeil asked.

"Absolutely," Anulewicz answered.

"And did it cause the dismissal, or what's your perspective?" the judge followed up.

"Does it matter at all whether or not the conduct was the reason for the dismissal?" Hodges also asked.

The attorney said yes "for the purposes of" 17-11-6.

"There is an improper conduct element to the award of attorney's fees, just like there is if you are acting in bad faith or all these other things that you put into attorney's fees-type provisions," Anulewicz said. "Here, yeah, it becomes a question. The trial judge is going to have to find that there was improper conduct. I think the record supports that."

Wakeford argued that the "unique circumstances and facts of this case required" McAfee to "understand and to consider how strange this was [when he] put the very party whose decision initiated these proceedings" — Skandalakis — "in charge of representing the interests of the DA's office, whose interests are imperiled by these proceedings."