4th Circuit uses SCOTUS opinion that defanged administrative state to issue pro-immigrant ruling in loss for Trump admin and 'sharp break from past'

A federal court of appeals this week issued a significant pro-immigration ruling that relies on a recent landmark opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court about the power of administrative agencies.

In June 2024, the nation's high court announced the end of the "administrative state" in the opinion in the case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The 6-3 majority opinion eliminated so-called "Chevron deference," a long-standing precedent that provided a framework for when and how the judiciary should defer to an agency's interpretation of a federal statute.

Now, in the aftermath of Loper Bright, judges are no longer constrained by an agency's interpretation of a statute.

For several decades, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) viewed a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as something of a double-edged sword for certain immigrants.

On Monday, a unanimous panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit decidedly smoothed down one of those edges.

In a 23-page opinion, the panel overturned precedent governing the immigration consequences of a vacated criminal conviction.

For years, the BIA said there were effectively two different kinds of vacated convictions. One kind of vacatur favored immigrants. Another kind of vacatur disfavored immigrants. Under Chevron deference, courts were forced to accept the agency's interpretation of the statute in question: 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i).

"Under that framework, a conviction vacated because of a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying proceedings no longer qualifies as a conviction for immigration purposes, while a conviction vacated for rehabilitation, immigration hardship, or another reason still does," the appellate court opinion explains. "Many courts deferentially accepted that distinction."

The 4th Circuit is now taking a fresh look at the statute.

The opinion explains that the BIA previously created the distinction in applying the statute "that sought to balance policy priorities." This distinction, the opinion further explains, was based "on the state court's reason for vacating" any given conviction.

In the present case, Lizbeyde Yanez Piedra was once convicted of marijuana possession — but that conviction was later vacated and the underlying charge against her was dismissed.

The Trump administration argues the pre-Chevron understanding of the statute — which is still advanced by the BIA — controls.

This understanding is simply not supported by the text of the statute, the appellate court determined.

"Start with the text," the opinion reads. "Section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) makes inadmissible 'any alien convicted of' a controlled-substance offense … the disputed question is not whether she was once convicted. It is whether she is an 'alien convicted of' the offense."

The appeals court answered the question in the negative.

"Yanez Piedra argues that her vacated conviction for possession of marijuana does not make her an 'alien convicted of' a controlled-substance violation," the opinion reads. "We agree. The Board's reason-for-vacatur framework cannot govern because it conflicts with the statute's best reading."

Rather, the statute refers to what it calls "the legal-status reading," the panel says, which is a reading that "rests on the view that [the statute] describes a current characteristic of the alien."

The panel uses a few examples to explain its reading:

[T]he term "convicted" is acting as a past participle. Consider how other past participles—like "married," "licensed," or "employed"—might be understood in various contexts. If a restaurant extends a military discount to "any person married to an active-duty service member," we would not expect a soldier's ex-wife to receive a discount. If an airline limits its pilot applications to "any person licensed to fly commercial airplanes," a person whose license has lapsed should not expect a callback. And if a company provides a year-end bonus to "any person employed full-time by the company," the company need not give a bonus to a part-time employee who used to work full-time.

"In each example, the text and context of the policy suggest that the relevant characteristic must currently apply," the opinion goes on. "We read the plain language of §1182(a)(2)(A)(i) the same way: 'any alien convicted of' a controlled-substance offense raises a legal-status question."

The court also explicitly rejects the BIA's policy-focused bifurcation.

"The Board's framework for analyzing vacated convictions may make good policy, but it is not the result of good statutory interpretation," the opinion continues. "Because Yanez Piedra's drug conviction has been vacated, she is not now an 'alien convicted of' a controlled-substance offense."

The court takes the opportunity to note that its opinion is a stark departure from the past in the post-Loper Bright landscape.

"For decades, Chevron deference restricted courts from exercising their duty 'to say what the law is,'" the opinion reads. "Newly freed from that restraint, courts now exercise their independent judgment about the best meaning of statutes. The practical change will often be modest. But other times, a fresh read will mark a sharp break with past practice. This is that type of case."